Field of Science

The many tragedies of Edward Teller

This is a revised version of a post written a few years ago on physicist Edward Teller's birthday.

Edward Teller was born on this day 107 years ago. Teller is best known to the general public for two things: his reputation as the “father of the hydrogen bomb” and as a key villain in the story of the downfall of Robert Oppenheimer. To me Teller will always be a prime example of the harm that brilliant men can do – either by accident or design – when they are placed in positions of power; as the famed historian Richard Rhodes said about Teller in an interview, “Teller consistently gave bad advice to every president that he worked for”. It’s a phenomenon that is a mainstay of politics but Teller’s case sadly indicates that even science can be put into the service of such misuse of power.
Ironically it is the two most publicly known facts about Teller that are also probably not entirely accurate. Later in life he often complained that the public had exaggerated his roles in both the hydrogen bomb program and in the ousting of Oppenheimer, and this contention was largely true. In truth he deserved both less credit and less blame for his two major acts. Without Teller hydrogen bombs would still have been developed and without Teller Oppenheimer would still have been removed from his role as the government’s foremost scientific advisor.
The question that continues to dog historians and scientists is simple; why did Teller behave the way he did? By any account he was a brilliant man, well attuned to the massive overkill by nuclear weapons that he was advocating and also well attuned to the damage he would cause Oppenheimer and the scientific community by testifying against the father of the atomic bomb. He was also often a warm person and clearly desired friendship with his peers, so why did he choose to alienate so many who were close to him? The answers to these questions undoubtedly lie in Teller’s background. Growing up in progressive Hungary at the turn of the century as the son of a well to do Jewish father, Teller was part of a constellation of Hungarian prodigies with similar cultural and family backgrounds who followed similar trajectories, emigrated to the United States and became famous scientists. Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner and John von Neumann were all childhood friends.
Sadly Teller became a psychological casualty of Hungary’s post-World War 1 communist and fascist regimes early in his childhood when he witnessed first hand the depredations visited upon his country by Bela Kun and then by Miklos Horthy. The chaos and uncertainty brought about by the communists left a deep impression on the sensitive young boy and traumatized him for life. Later when Teller migrated to Germany, England and America he saw the noose of Nazism tightening around Europe. This combined double blow brought about by the cruelties of communism and Nazism seems to have dictated almost every one of Teller’s major decisions for the rest of his life.
The fear of totalitarianism manifested itself early, leading Teller to be among the first ones to push for a US nuclear weapons program. He was Leo Szilard’s driver when Szilard went to meet Einstein in his Long Island cottage and got the famous letter to FDR signed by the great physicist. Along with Szilard and Wigner Teller was the first one to raise the alarm about a potential German atomic project and he lobbied vigorously for the government to take notice. By the time the war started he was a respected professor at George Washington University. Goaded by his experiences and inner conscience, Teller became one of Oppenheimer’s first recruits at Los Alamos where he moved at the beginning of the Manhattan Project in the spring of 1943.
Oppenheimer and Teller’s meeting was like one of those fateful events in Greek tragedies which is destined to end in friction and tragedy. Perhaps the most ironic twist in this story is how similar the two men were; brilliant physicists who were both products of high culture and affluent families, interested in literature and the arts, envisioning a great role for themselves in history and sensitive to the plight of human beings around them. However their personalities clashed almost right from the beginning, although the mistrust was mostly engendered by Teller.
Not all of it was Teller’s fault however. By the time Teller met Oppenheimer the latter had established himself as the foremost American-born theoretical physicist of his age, a man who could hold sway over even Nobel Laureates with his astonishingly quick mind, dazzlingly Catholic interests and knowledge and ability to metamorphose into adopting whatever role history had thrust upon him. But men like Oppenheimer are hardly simple, and Oppenheimer’s colleagues and students usually fell into two extreme camps, those who saw him as an insecure and pretentious poseur and those who idolized his intellect. Clearly Teller fell into the former group.
The friction between the two men was accentuated after Teller moved to Los Alamos when Oppenheimer made Hans Bethe the head of the project’s important theoretical division. Teller understandably chafed at the choice since unlike Bethe he had lived with the project since the beginning, but Oppenheimer’s decision was wise; he had sized up both physicists and realized that while both were undoubtedly scientifically capable, administering a division of prima donnas needed steadfast determination, levelheaded decision making and the ability to be a team player while quietly soothing egos, all of which were qualities inherent in Bethe but not in the volatile Teller.
Teller never really recovered from this slight and from then on his relationship with both Oppenheimer and Bethe (with whom he had been best friends for years) was increasingly strained. It wouldn’t be the first time he let the personal interfere with the professional and I think this was his first great tragedy – the inability to separate personal feelings from objective thinking. It was also during the war that the idea of using an atomic bomb to ignite a self-sustaining fusion reaction caught Teller’s imagination. Teller confirmed Oppenheimer’s decision to hire Bethe when he refused to perform detailed calculations for the implosion weapon and insisted that he work on his pet idea for the “Super”, a diversion that was undoubtedly orthogonal to the urgent task of producing an atomic bomb, especially one which was necessary to light up the Super in any case.
After the war got over Teller kept on pushing for the hydrogen bomb. History was on his side and the increasing encroachment of the Soviets into Eastern Europe followed by major events like the Berlin airlift and the testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb firmed up his conviction and allowed him to drum up support from scientists, politicians and the military. Sadly his initial design for the Super was fatally flawed; while an atomic bomb would in fact ignite a large mass of tritium or deuterium, energy losses would be too rapid to sustain a successful fusion reaction. Even after knowing this Teller kept pushing for the design, taking advantage of the worsening political situation and his own growing prominence in the scientific community. This was Teller’s first real dishonest act.
His second dishonest act was withholding credit from the man who actually came up with the first successful idea for a hydrogen bomb – Stanislaw Ulam. An exceptionally brilliant and versatile mathematician, Ulam first performed detailed calculations that revealed holes in Teller’s original Super design and then thought of the key process of radiation implosion that would compress a batch of thermonuclear fuel and enable its sustained fusion. Teller who had been smoldering with rage at Ulam’s calculations until then immediately saw the merit of the idea and significantly refined it. Since then almost every hydrogen bomb in the world’s nuclear arsenals has been constructed on the basis of the Teller-Ulam model. Yet Teller seems to have denied Ulam the credit for the idea even in his later years, something that is especially puzzling considering that he downplayed his own role in the development of hydrogen bombs in the waning years of his life. Was this simply a ploy engineered to gain sympathy and to display false modesty? We will never know.
The act for which Teller became infamous followed only a few years later in 1954. Since the end of the war Oppenheimer had been steadfast in his opposition to the hydrogen bomb, not just on a moral basis but also on a technical basis. This did not go down well with the establishment, especially in the face of the increasingly dire-looking international situation. Oppenheimer was hardly the only one opposing the project – prominent scientists like Enrico Fermi and Isidor Rabi were even more vocal in their opposition – but Oppenheimer’s reputation, his role as the government’s foremost nuclear advisor and his often casual cruelty and impatience with lesser men made him stand out. After the Teller-Ulam design came to light Oppenheimer actually supported the project but by that time he had already made powerful enemies, especially in the person of Lewis Strauss, a vindictive, petty and thin-skinned former Secretary of the Navy who unfortunately had the ear of President Eisenhower.
When the government brought charges against Oppenheimer Teller was asked to testify. He could have declined and still saved his reputation but he chose not to. Curiously, the actual testimony offered by Teller is at the same time rather straightforward as well as vague enough to be interpreted damningly. It has an air of calculated ambiguity about it that makes it particularly potent. What Teller said was the following:
In a great number of cases I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act – I understood that Dr. Oppenheimer acted – in a way which for me was exceedingly hard to understand. I thoroughly disagreed with him in numerous issues and his actions frankly appeared to me confused and complicated. To this extent I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better, and therefore trust more.
What is interesting about the testimony, as explained by Freeman Dyson in his autobiography, is that it’s actually quite undramatic and true. Oppenheimer had lied to army officials during the war regarding an indirect approach made to him for ferrying secrets to the Soviet Union. He had refused right away but had then concocted an unnecessary and bizarre “cock and bull story” (in his own words) to explain his actions. That story had not gotten him into trouble during the war because of his indispensable role in the project, but it certainly qualified him as “confused and complicated”. In addition after the war, Oppenheimer’s views on nuclear weapons also often appeared conflicted, as did his loyalties to his former students. Oppenheimer’s opinions on the hydrogen bomb which were quite sound were however also interpreted as “confused and complicated” by Teller. But where Teller was coming from, Oppenheimer’s actions were hard to understand, and therefore it was clear that Teller would trust opinions regarding national security in someone’s else’s hands. Thus Teller’s testimony was actually rather unsurprising and sensible when seen in a certain context.
As it happened however, his words were seen as a great betrayal by the majority of physicists who supported Oppenheimer. The result of this perception was that Teller himself was damaged far more by his testimony than was Oppenheimer. Close friends simply stopped talking to him and one former colleague publicly refused to shake his hand, a defiant display that led Teller to retire to his room and weep. He was essentially declared a pariah by a large part of the wartime physics community. It is likely that Teller would have reconsidered testifying against Oppenheimer had he known the personal price he would have to pay. But the key point here is that Teller had again let personal feelings interfere with objective decision making; Teller’s animosity toward Oppenheimer went back years, and he knew that as long as the emperor ruled he could never take his place. This was his chance to stage a coup. As it happened his decision simply led to a great tragedy of his life, a tragedy that was particularly acute since his not testifying would have essentially made no difference in the revocation of Oppenheimer’s security clearance.
This inability to keep the personal separate from reality exemplified Teller’s obsession with nuclear weapons for the next fifty years until his death. At one point he was paranoid enough to proclaim that he saw himself in a Soviet prison camp within five years. I will not go so far as to label Teller paranoid from a medical standpoint but some of the symptoms certainly seem to be there. Teller’s attachment to his hydrogen bombs became so absolute that he essentially opposed almost every effort to seek reconciliation and arms reductions with the Soviets. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, the NPT, the ABM treaty and sound scientific opposition to Reagan’s fictional “Star Wars” defense; all met with his swift disapproval even when the science argued otherwise, as in the case of Star Wars . He also publicly debated Linus Pauling regarding the genetic effects of radiation just as he would debate Carl Sagan twenty years later regarding nuclear winter.
Sagan has a particularly illuminating take on Teller’s relationship with nuclear weapons in his book “The Demon- Haunted World”. The book has an entire chapter on Teller in which Sagan tries to understand Teller’s love affair with bombs. Sagan’s opinion is that Teller was actually sincere in his beliefs that nuclear weapons were humanity’s savior. He actually believed that these weapons would solve all our problems in war and peace. This led to him advocating rather outlandish uses for nuclear weapons: “Do you want to find out more about moon dust? Explode a nuclear weapon on the moon and analyze the spectrum of the resulting dust. Do you want to excavate harbors or change the course of rivers? Nuclear weapons can do the job”. Teller’s proposal to excavate harbors in Alaska using bombs led to appropriate opposition from the Alaskan natives. In many of these scenarios he seemed to simply ignore the biological effects of fallout.
But as much as I appreciate Sagan’s view that Teller was sincere in his proposals I find it hard to digest; Teller was smart enough to know the collateral damage caused by nuclear weapons, or to know how ridiculous the idea of using nuclear weapons to study moon dust sounded when there were much simpler methods to do it. My opinion is that by this time he had travelled so far along the path which he chose for himself after the war that he simply could not retract his steps. He clung to dubious peacetime uses of nuclear weapons simply so that he could advocate their buildup in wartime. By this time the man was too far along to choose another role in his life. That, I think, was another of Teller’s tragedies.
But in my view, Teller’s greatest tragedy had nothing to do with nuclear weapons. It was simply the fact that in pursuit of his obsession with bombs he wasted his great scientific gifts and failed to become a truly great physicist. Ironically he again shared this fate with his nemesis Robert Oppenheimer. Before the war both Oppenheimer and Teller had made significant contributions to science. Teller is so famous for his weapons work that it is easy to ignore his scientific research. Along with two other scientists he worked out an important equation describing the adsorption of gases to solids. Another very significant Teller contribution known to chemists is the Jahn-Teller effect, a distortion of geometry in certain inorganic molecular complexes that impacts key properties like color and magnetic behavior. In nuclear physics Teller again came up with several ideas including the Gamow-Teller rules that describe energy transitions in nuclei. Even after the war Teller kept on thinking about science, working for instance on Thomas-Fermi theory which was the precursor of techniques used to calculate important properties of molecules.
But after 1945 Teller’s scientific gifts essentially lay undisturbed, stagnating in all their creative glory. Edward Teller the theoretical physicist was slowly but surely banished to the shadows and Edward Teller the nuclear weapons expert and political advocate took his place. A similar fate befell Oppenheimer, although for many years he at least stayed in touch with the latest developments in physics. Seduced by power, both men forgot what had brought them to this juncture in history to begin with. In pursuing power they ignored their beloved science.
Ultimately one fact stands apart stark and clear in my view: Edward Teller’s obsession with nuclear weapons will likely become a historical curiosity but the Jahn-Teller will persist for all eternity. This, I think, is the real tragedy.

Is this the dawn of a golden age of private science funding?

Paul Allen is just one example of billionaires who are productively
funding cutting-edge and important science (Image: Forbes)
Last year, the BICEP2 experiment dropped a bombshell in the physics world by announcing potential evidence for gravitational waves from inflation as well as support for the quantization of gravity. The news was all over the place. Unfortunately the discovery turned out to be premature to say the least, and within a few months it turned to dust. But that's not the point of this post. What was less appreciated was the fact that BICEP2 was prominently funded by the Keck Foundation and the Betty and Gordon Moore Foundation. William Keck was an oil magnate who made very significant contributions to astronomy by funding the Keck Telescopes. Gordon Moore was a computer magnate who made significant contributions to information technology and proposed Moore’s Law. Fred Kavli who died last year started the Kavli Foundation; this foundation has backed everything from Obama’s Brain Initiative to astrophysics to nanoscience professorships at research universities.
It is with this background in my mind that I was very pleased to read an article by William Broad in the New York Times from last year about the private funding of research. Broad talks about how a variety of billionaire entrepreneurs ranging from the Moores (Intel) to Larry Ellison and his wife (Oracle) to Paul Allen (Microsoft) have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the last two decades to fund a variety of scientific endeavors ranging from groundbreaking astrophysics to nanoscience. For these billionaires a few millions of dollars is not too much, but for a single scientific project hinging on the vicissitudes of government funding it can be a true lifeline. The article talked about how science will come to rely on such private funding in the near future in the absence of government support, and personally I think this funding is going to do a very good job in stepping in where the government has failed.
The public does not often realize that for most of its history, science was in fact privately funded. During the early scientific revolution in Europe, important research often came from what we can call self-philanthropy, exemplified by rich men like Henry Cavendish and Antoine Lavoisier who essentially did science as a hobby and made discoveries that are now part of the textbooks. Cavendish’s fortune funded the famed Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge where Ernest Rutherford discovered the atomic nucleus and Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA. This trend continued for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The current era of reliance on government grants by the NIH, the NSF and other agencies is essentially a postwar phenomenon. 
Before the war a lot of very important science as well as science education was funded by trust funds set up by rich businessmen. During the 1920s, when the center of physics research was in Europe, the Rockefeller and Guggenheim foundation gave postdoctoral fellowships to brilliant young scientists like Linus Pauling, Robert Oppenheimer and Isidor Rabi to travel to Europe and study with masters like Bohr, Born and Sommerfeld. It was these fellowships that crucially allowed young American physicists to quarry their knowledge of the new quantum mechanics to America. It was partly this largesse that allowed Oppenheimer to create a school of physics that equaled the great European centers and produce a roster of scientists whose students continue to win Nobel Prizes.
Perhaps nobody exemplified the bond between philanthropy and research better than Ernest Lawrence who was as much an astute businessman as an accomplished experimental physicist. Lawrence came up with his breakthrough idea for a cyclotron in the early 30s but it was the support of rich California businessmen – several of whom he regularly took on tours of his Radiation Lab at Berkeley – that allowed him to secure support for cyclotrons of increasing size and power. It was Lawrence’s cyclotrons that allowed physicists to probe the inner structure of the nucleus, construct theories explaining this structure and produce uranium for the atomic bombs used during the war. There were other notable examples of philanthropic science funding during the 30s, with the most prominent case being the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton which was bankrolled by the Bamberger brother-sister duo.
As the New York Times article notes, during the last three decades private funding has expanded to include cutting-edge biological and earth sciences research. The Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle, for example, is making a lot of headway in understanding neuronal connectivity and how it gives rise to thoughts and feelings: to advance its goals the institute managed to lure away one of the most insightful neuroscientist in the world from a tenured faculty position at Caltech - Christof Koch. The research funded by twenty-first century billionaires ranges across the spectrum and comes from a mixture of curiosity about the world and personal interest. 
The personal interest is especially reflected in funding for rare and neurodegenerative diseases; even the richest people in the world know that they are not immune from cancer and Alzheimer’s disease so it’s in their own best interests to fund research in such areas. For instance Larry Page has a speaking problem while Sergey Brin carries a gene that predisposes him to Parkinson’s; no wonder Page is interested in a new institute for aging research. However the benefits that accrue from such research will aid everyone, not just the very rich. As another example, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation which was funded by well-to-do individuals whose children were stricken by the devastating disease gave about $70 million to Vertex Pharmaceuticals. The infusion partly allowed Vertex to create Kalydeco, the first truly breakthrough drug for treating a disease where there were essentially no transformative options before. The drug is not cheap but there is no doubt that it has completely changed people’s lives.
But the billionaires are not just funding disease. They are funding almost every imaginable field, from astronomy to paleontology:
“They have mounted a private war on disease, with new protocols that break down walls between academia and industry to turn basic discoveries into effective treatments. They have rekindled traditions of scientific exploration by financing hunts for dinosaur bones and giant sea creatures. They are even beginning to challenge Washington in the costly game of big science, with innovative ships, undersea craft and giant telescopes — as well as the first private mission to deep space.”
That part about challenging government funding really puts this development in perspective. It’s hardly news that government support for basic science has steadily declined during the last decade, and a sclerotic Congress that seems perpetually unable to agree on anything means that the problem will endure for a long time. As Francis Collins notes in the article, 2014 saw an all time funding low in NIH grants. In the face of such increasing withdrawal by the government from basic scientific research, it can only be good news that someone else is stepping up to the plate. Angels step in sometimes where fools fear to tread. And in an age when it is increasingly hard for this country to be proud of its public funding it can at least be proud of its private funding; no other country can claim to showcase this magnitude of science philanthropy.
There has been some negative reaction to the news. The responses come mostly from those who think science is being “privatized” and that these large infusions of cash will fund only trendy research. Some negative reactions have also come from those who find it hard to keep their disapproval of what they see as certain billionaires’ insidious political machinations – those of the Koch (not Christof Koch!) brothers for instance – separate from their support of science. There is also a legitimate concern that at least some of this funding will go to diseases affecting rich, white people rather than minorities.
I have three responses to this criticism. Firstly, funding trendy research is still better than funding no research at all. In addition many of the diseases that are being explored by this funding affect all of us and not just rich people. Secondly, we need to keep raw cash for political manipulation separate from raw cash for genuinely important research. Thirdly, believing that these billionaires somehow “control” the science they fund strikes me as a little paranoid. For instance, a stone’s throw from where I live sits the Broad Institute, a $700 million dollar endeavor funded by Eli Broad. The Broad Institute is affiliated with both Harvard and MIT. During the last decade it has made important contributions to basic research including genomics and chemical biology. Its scientists have published in basic research journals and have shared their data. The place has largely functioned like an academic institution, with no billionaire around to micromanage the scientists’ everyday work. The same goes for other institutes like the Allen Institute. Unlike some critics, I don’t see the levers of these institutes being routinely pulled by their benefactors at all. The Bambergers never told Einstein what to do.
Ultimately I am a both a human being and a scientist, so I don’t care as much about where the source of science funding comes from as whether it benefits our understanding of life and the universe and leads to advances improving the quality of life of our fellow human beings. From everything that I have read, private funding for science during the last two decades has eminently achieved both these goals. I hope it endures.

Adapted from a previous post on Scientific American Blogs.

A good year for science movies

Felicity Jones and Eddie Redmayne's remarkable
performances make "Theory of Everything" soar 
Movies about scientists get made quite rarely, so by those standards 2014 was definitely a bonanza year for such films. First there was the excellent "Particle Fever" which is now available on Netflix. Particle Fever vividly conveys the excitement of doing science as opposed to, well, movie science. And it does this by focusing not just on the leading lights of the quest for the Higgs Boson but on the foot soldiers who carry out the daily, often tedious and uncertain work of shuffling through the data and picking out signal from noise. The champagne, celebratory hurrahs and Nobel Prizes are only the tip of an iceberg which has been solidly laying its foundation for years through the toil of ordinary men and women, and Particle Fever brings out this message exceedingly well.

Particle Fever was followed by "The Imitation Game" which I saw last month. It's based on Alan Turing's definitive biography, Andrew Hodges's "The Enigma", and since I made the 'mistake' of reading the book before watching the movie I perhaps did not enjoy it as much as I could have. To its credit it gets several details right including a fair amount of detail regarding the actual Enigma machine. But where it errs in my opinion is in casting Benedict Cumberbatch as Alan Turing and Matthew Goode as his friendly rival. Now Cumberbatch and Goode are both fine actors, but the problem is that Cumberbatch is also a star, and in both achievements and personality Alan Turing was not a star, at least not until way after his death. It's a bit like casting Tom Cruise as Richard Feynman (who actually was much closer than Turing to being a star in real life). The movie also exaggerates a lot of things, including Turing's friendship with Keira Knightley's character and his authority over decision-making regarding whether or not to convey critical intelligence information to those manning the merchant convoys in the Atlantic. And while not exactly tiptoeing around his homosexuality, the film could have done a much better job of portraying how forthcoming and brave Turing was about that aspect of himself. Overall the effort is not bad, but it could have been much better if it had tried to be more of an honest biography and less of a box office hit.

That brings me to "Theory of Everything" which I watched last weekend. I had avoided watching it for days, mainly because almost everyone I asked had told me that it was a little too sappy and mawkish and was basically a love story with little and botched attention paid to Hawking's science - all the wrong ingredients in my opinion in a movie about a great scientist. But with nothing better playing I decided to go ahead anyway. The first half of the movie seemed to confirm my worst fears: not only were there some sappy moments, but even more ominously the dialogue seemed leaden, the editing poor and the treatment of the science continued to be lazy (at one point there are copies of Nature with Hawking's photoshopped *face* on the cover - displayed in *bookstores*. I guess it's never too late for a scientist to fantasize...). 

But then something remarkable happens in the second half: it's almost as if a new director has appeared on the scene and the movie has undergone a complete midstream facelift. The dialogue gets better, and while many scenes are still sappy they are also full of heart. What really changes between the first and second half and almost completely redeems the movie's shortcomings are the astonishing performances by Eddie Redmayne and Felicity Jones as Stephen Hawking and his wife Jane. In this case unlike that of "The Imitation Game", the movie really benefits from having a relatively unknown actor play the role: although Mr. Redmayne's amazing facial expressions and bearing make it clear that he is a star in the making. But if anyone could be said to top his performance it's Felicity Jones. I cannot remember when, in recent memory, I have seen an actress who could convey so much through her face and eyes without speaking. Mr. Redmayne has an eminently deserved Oscar nomination, but Ms. Jones should undoubtedly get one for her performance. The scene where she and Hawking decide to part ways is one of the most touching scenes I have seen in a recent movie.

The great achievement that the two actors manage to pull together is to paint the most human portrait of Stephen Hawking that I have ever seen committed to a public medium. Because of his brilliant mind and his almost surreal triumph over his disability, of all scientists Hawking especially is seen as a grand, legendary, distant character; perhaps the only contemporary scientist who inspires a reverence verging on the religious. Redmayne and Jones thankfully shatter this illusion and bring us a Hawking who is as human as the guy next door, who has the same follies and frustration and relationship issues as the rest of us. This true revelation alone makes the movie eminently memorable and worth watching.

Book Review: Elizabeth Kolbert's "The Sixth Extinction"

Elizabeth Kolbert combines the sharp observational powers of a field biologist with the literary skill of a seasoned and thoughtful writer. In her previous book “Notes from a Field Catastrophe”, she travelled to far-flung parts of the globe to dig up stories on the deleterious effects of climate change. In her latest book she combines similar reporting from around the world with chapters from the history of science to bring us a noteworthy account of one of the most spectacular and important stories of biology and history – mass extinctions. There have been five documented big extinctions in history, with the most popular one being the death of the dinosaurs that was memorably caused by a meteorite. However we are probably now in the throes of a sixth extinction, and as Kolbert documents, at least parts of it are being caused by human beings’ destructive tendencies and our unquenchable thirst for natural resources. The concern for extinctions is not merely a discussion for the drawing rooms of bleeding-heart environmentalists; as a chemist, I am well-aware that about half of all drugs on the market are derived from natural sources. Every time we kill off another marine sponge or frog, we may be depriving ourselves of the next breakthrough drug against cancer or AIDS.

Kolbert starts by telling us how we came to know about extinctions in the eighteenth century. It took a long time for scientists and the public to actually believe in such devastating events, simply because of their magnitude. It was Georges Cuvier, a French naturalist, who painstakingly collected fossils and bones of giant and exotic creatures from around the world and turned conjecture into reality. By cataloging their sheer abundance Cuvier convinced everyone of the reality of worlds lost in time that were completely different from our own. Charles Darwin and Charles Lyell who came after Cuvier also debated extinctions; but since Darwin’s theory required very gradual changes over time, he could not quite fathom how entire species of animals could disappear in an evolutionary eyeblink. Kolbert also tells the fascinating story of the Alvarez father-son duo who discovered the potential reason for the extinction of the dinosaurs by measuring the startlingly high concentration of iridium – an element found in abundance only in meteorites – in certain clay layers.

The real meat of the book is Kolbert’s travels to different parts of the world and her reporting of what seem like extinctions of specific species. In one chapter she explores the impact of climate change on ocean acidification – one of the more neglected aspects of the global warming debate – on coral reefs. Ocean acidification is a consequence of simple chemistry; when carbon dioxide dissolves in water it lowers its pH, and the resulting acidic solution starts to eat away at corals which are composed of calcium carbonate.

Last year I was in Hawaii and one of the most revealing experiences I had there was snorkeling around the island where Captain James Cook was killed. Peering through the goggles, I could see not only a spectacular ecosystem of fishes, tube worms, sea cucumbers, jellyfish and other denizens of the deep but also how critically dependent all of them were on the coral reefs. The worms were permanently latched on to the reefs and the fishes were constantly kissing the surface with puckered lips, consuming the plant and microbial material deposited in the oxygen-rich pores of the intricate structures. Clearly the reefs support many living worlds, and as Kolbert finds out first-hand, these worlds are being depleted by ocean acidification. Even those who may be skeptical of the warming effects of CO2 emissions should take this impact very seriously. And as I mentioned before, nor is this concern purely moral; marine sponges have been the source of some of the most promising drugs against cancer and will continue to be so.

Kolbert also explores the disappearance of other species spanning the spectrum of species diversity, from birds to frogs to mammals. In documenting this she travels to caves in Italy, rain forests in Central Africa and even a location in – of all places – suburban New Jersey, where traces of the K/T boundary event that killed off the dinosaurs can be found. Fungal infections seem to be a leading and particularly concerning cause of several current extinctions, most notably those of New England bats and Panamian golden frogs. Amphibians are more affected than almost any other species partly because of their sensitive skin. In a vivid chapter Kolbert locates an artificial ecosystem set up by scientists in Panama where the last few hundred golden frogs survive. By now the fungus is so rampant in their natural environment that releasing them outside would be fatal. These brightly colored creatures, nurtured by their human caretakers, are the last surviving members of their tribe and on the brink of disappearing from the face of the planet. A similar poignant chapter introduced us to a male Hawaiian crow, who just like the golden frogs, is part of a species that exists only in a zoo. All attempts by the zoo personnel to induce this crow to mate have been unsuccessful so far and one does not know how much longer his thread will stay unbroken.

Kolbert wisely stays away from attributing many of these species disappearances to human activity. But in many cases there is strong evidence that does link human activity to rapid species depletion. In this context deforestation may be an even bigger threat than climate change; indeed, a universal mathematical scaling law linking number of species to area seems to encapsulate the impact of deforestation. So is the introduction of non-endemic species by air and sea travel which when introduced into a new ecosystem find themselves free of predators and start decimating the local population; the brown tree snake which was introduced in Guam and which literally ate its way through several bird and amphibian populations is a noteworthy case. The voracious zebra mussel which has wreaked havoc in waterways in the US is another example.

The impact of humans is undeniable, and in measuring this impact we see the sometimes cruel and indifferent streaks of inhumanity which mark us as one of the few species on the planet which takes pleasure in killing others. Particularly barbaric was the butchering of the flightless Great Auk to extinction in Northern Europe in the nineteenth century; Kolbert talks about how hungry sailors devoured the auks not only by dunking them in boiling water but also by using them as fuel for the fire underneath. One of the simple reasons why humans can quickly render larger animals extinct is because of their slow breeding rate. This explains the disappearance of the megafauna in New Zealand for instance, where the hunting of the large, flightless moa provides a stark test case. In ecosystems untouched by humans, whatever disadvantages are suffered by creatures because of their slow reproductive rate can be compensated for by their larger size and strength. When intelligent human beings wielding weapons arrive on the scene, the equation radically changes. This is precisely why larger animals like lions, tigers and apes are the most threatened species today.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of humans’ devastating impact on other species emerges when we look not to distant species but to a very close one – the Neanderthal. One of the most significant discoveries in science during the last few years has been the realization that after encountering Neanderthals in Europe and Western Asia about forty thousand years ago, Homo sapiens first interbred with them and then somehow killed them off. There is something deeply creepy about this fact. As revealed by groundbreaking recent work on sequencing Neanderthal DNA, virtually all of us have between 1 and 4 percent of this DNA in our own genome. We may even have inherited a few genes for disease from our close cousins. This work has been made possible largely by the efforts of Swedish geneticist Svante Paabo who Kolbert interviews, and his recent book provides a fascinating look at the sequencing of the Neanderthal genome.

What caused Neanderthals to go extinct while we lived? War certainly could be one reason; after all population sizes as well as mortality rates then were quite low. Perhaps Neanderthal populations were already on the brink of extinction when humans met them so purely on a statistical basis they may have been unlikely to survive for too long. My favorite explanation is disease. It is very much possible that interbreeding between modern humans and Neanderthals made the latter more susceptible to certain diseases passed on from humans. Neanderthals could also have been more prone to certain diseases to begin with. There is also some evidence that humans were more creative and intelligent than Neanderthals, so we may have been better equipped to deal with diseases than our “less evolved” cousins. Whatever the reason, the co-existence of humans and Neanderthals followed by their disappearance is another data point on the table of extinctions in which humans might have played a dominant role.

The whole saga of extinctions also conceals a profound irony. In death there is life. The same great five extinctions that killed off more than 90% of species on the planet also opened up ecological niches and resources to previously suppressed creatures. Dinosaurs made room for mammals and amphibians and led to the evolution of human beings. It is also almost poetically ironic that a few members of the same human species that killed off so many of its evolutionarily distant and close cousins are also making heroic efforts to preserve the remaining members of certain species in zoos and other ecological enclaves. We don’t know how this story of extinctions is going to end. Perhaps it will end with humans killing most other species on the planet by breaking the chain of interdependencies between various animals and plants. If we do this we may be killing ourselves by destroying the intricate web of natural resources that allows us to farm, feed and clothe the world. Or perhaps we may kill ourselves more directly through climate change, overpopulation or nuclear war. In any case, the history of extinctions tells us that the planet will survive. Nature always finds a way.

Naomi Oreskes and false positives in climate change: Do we know enough?

Historian of science Naomi Oreskes who has long since been a campaigner against climate change and science denialists (her book "Merchants of Doubt" is a touchstone in this regard) has a New York Times Op-Ed titled "Playing Dumb on Climate Change" in which she essentially - to my eyes at least - asks that scientists slightly lower the standards of statistical significance when assessing the evidence for climate change.

It's not that Oreskes is saying that we should actually use sloppier standards for climate change analysis. Her argument is much more reasonable and specific but ultimately she still seems to embrace a kind of certainty that I do not think exists in the field. She starts by reminding us of the two common errors in any kind of statistical analysis: Type 1 and Type II. In my field I tend to use the more informative names 'false positives' and 'false negatives' so that's what I will stick with here. False positives arise when you are too generous and allow spurious data along with legitimate facts. False negatives arise when you are too curmudgeonly and disallow legitimate facts. In some sense false positives are better than false negatives since you would rather run the risk of getting some noise along with all the signal rather than missing some of the signal.

The risk of getting false negatives vs false positives is governed in part by the confidence limits you are using. A confidence limit of 95% means that your standards for accepting something as a signal are very high - it means that you are bound to reject some true signal, resulting in a false negative. When you reduce the confidence limits, say to 90%, then you are lowering the bar for marking something as a signal, leading potentially to some false positives creeping in along with the true signal.

The crux of Oreskes's argument is that until now climate scientists have largely used a very high confidence limit for accepting and rejecting evidence which in her opinion has led to some false negatives. She is right that the magic number of 95% is arbitrary and has no objective basis in natural law. But, and this is her crucial point, we now know enough about the climate to warranty using slightly lower confidence limits since any false positives emerging from this lowered limit can be identified as such and therefore rejected. Perhaps, she suggests, we could consider using a lower confidence limit like 90% for climate change studies.

I see where Oreskes is coming from and her general argument about being able to use lower confidence limits in light of increased knowledge about a field is valid, but I am simply not as convinced as she is that we will be able to identify false positives in climate data and reject them. First of all, 'climate data' is a humungous and staggeringly heterogenous mass of facts from fields ranging from oceanography to soil chemistry. While we may be more confident about some of these facts, we don't know enough about others (especially concerning the biosphere) to be as confident about them. That means that we won't even know which facts are more likely to be false positives than others. There are certainly some false positives that are in the 'known unknown' category but there are also many others which are in the 'unknown unknown' category, so how will we identify these if they show up?

The second problem is that, even though I mentioned before that sometimes accepting false positives is better than rejecting true positives, in case of climate change one must weigh this tradeoff against the enormous cost and resources needed to pursue false positives. So for instance, if a false positive data point concerns melting glaciers in some part of the world, actually taking action to address that data point would mean the expenditure of tens of millions or even billions of dollars. Sadly in case of climate change, pursuing Type I errors is not as simple as spending a few man hours and a few thousand dollars investigating blind alleys.

Oreskes like many other thinkers in the field is well-meaning and her suggestions apply to fields where enough is known to confidently identify and weed out false positives, but in case of climate change we are straitjacketed by a problem that has tragically been the bane of the field since its inception: our lack of knowledge and general ignorance about a very complex, unpredictable system. Unless we bridge this gulf of ignorance significantly, a 90% confidence limit would be as arbitrary and dangerous as a 95% confidence limit.

In the matter of Walter Lewin, MIT goes medieval

By now most people must have heard the unpleasant news that Walter Lewin, the beloved and world-renowned physics teacher at MIT whose legendary video lectures drew comparison with the Feynman Lectures on Physics has been barred from campus and stripped of his emeritus professor title in response to charges of sexual harassment of a student in one of his MITx courses. Unfortunately, considering the very public fame that Lewin achieved, MIT has been frustratingly silent on divulging the details of the events, but we can only assume that the charges were quite serious and supported by strong evidence.

It's a very painful and precipitous fall from grace for someone who had achieved the kind of stardom reserved for a handful of science personalities - images of Lewin swinging from a pendulum to demonstrate how its period is independent of its mass, or risking being struck in the face and badly hurt by having the pendulum approach his face within a hairsbreadth are now part of science folklore. As someone who has savored many of his lectures as well as his book, I am not the only one to feel pained, confused and stunned.

What I find bizarre is that MIT has chosen to take down all the lectures that made him famous. I simply don't understand this, especially since they have quoted reasons of "safety" in doing this - how could Lewin possibly entice or harass students simply through explaining the motion of a simple pendulum through an old, archived lecture? Apply whatever punishment you see fit to him but why deprive millions of students around the world of the joy of physics? As an institution that pioneered online courses through the Open Courseware modules, it is particularly damning to have MIT engage in this action.

Sadly, the purging of Lewin's lectures from the online universe cannot help but bear comparison to the book burning and blacklisting of speech and writing that was so endemic in the Dark and Middle ages. MIT's actions are akin to banning, say, Wagner's operas because he was anti-Semitic, or Peter Debye's equations because there are hints that he was silently permissive at the very least during the rise of the Nazis. Their actions remind me of the movie "The Ten Commandments" in which, after learning that his beloved son is actually the son of a Hebrew slave, the Pharaoh issues an edict to have Moses's name stricken from every monument and parchment in the land so that his very existence can be erased from history. It really shouldn't be so hard to separate men from their actions, and I cannot understand what motive MIT could have had in taking down the lectures. I am assuming that content in the Internet age is not as lost to the chasm of ignorance as content existing in a few select printed volumes four hundreds years ago, but the issue is really about the medium, not about the message.

Whatever their motive, the message MIT is sending to the world is not too complimentary - we will put the objectivity of knowledge on the same pedestal as the fallibility of human beings, and if we find evidence for one we will banish the other one too. It's a very troubling precedent in my opinion. I do hope that especially an institution as committed to the spread of knowledge as MIT reconsiders the decision.

Update: I am glad to see that prominent MIT computer science professor Scott Aaronson has the same thoughts and in fact believes even more strongly than I that taking down the lectures is a huge mistake. I also agree with him that MIT needs to be much more forthcoming and transparent in revealing the details of the case to a perplexed public.

"I’m someone who feels that sexual harassment must never be tolerated, neither here nor anywhere else.  But I also feel that, if a public figure is going to be publicly brought down like this (yes, even by a private university), then the detailed findings of the investigation should likewise be made public, regardless of how embarrassing they are.  I know others differ, but I think the need of the world to see that justice was done overrides MIT’s internal administrative needs, and even Prof. Lewin’s privacy (the names of any victims could, of course, be kept secret). 
More importantly, I wish to register that I disagree in the strongest possible terms with MIT’s decision to remove Prof. Lewin’s lectures from OpenCourseWare—thereby forcing the tens of thousands of students around the world who were watching these legendary lectures to hunt for ripped copies on BitTorrent.  (Imagine that: physics lectures as prized contraband!)  By all means, punish Prof. Lewin as harshly as he deserves, but—as students have been pleading on Reddit, in the MIT Tech comments section, and elsewhere—don’t also punish the countless students of both sexes who continue to benefit from his work.  (For godsakes, I’d regard taking down the lectures as a tough call if Prof. Lewin had gone on a murder spree.)  Doing this sends the wrong message about MIT’s values, and is a gift to those who like to compare modern American college campuses to the Soviet Union."

The demise of SciAmBlogs

So I hear that SciAmBlogs is undergoing a radical overhaul and shedding no less than half of its bloggers, many of whom have been with the network since its inception. This includes many whose thought-provoking writings I respect - even though I don't always agree with them - like Janet Stemwedel and Eric Michael Johnson.

It's a shame really, because I think the network had really distinguished itself as one of the few blogging networks in the world whose bloggers had vibrant, independent voices and who were not afraid to write provocative posts. That being said, I don't have a problem seeing the logic of this move at all: after what happened during the last one year, it is clear that the network wants to repair what it sees as a broken image, wants to avoid dealing with even ten clamorous voices on Twitter, wants to stay away even from interesting controversy and - the importance of this aspect of any issue can never be underestimated - wants to please the lawyers. The rigors of maintaining a hundred and fifty year old organization's image are apparently much harder than the rigors of sustaining a diverse set of opinions and the accompanying freedom of speech.

However it is equally clear that by embarking on this new identity the site has picked safe over interesting and independent and has lost its reputation as a vibrant and diverse community of independent voices which you may not always agree with but whose views always provided food for thought. This is abundantly obvious from the new "guidelines" issued by the network - a veritable school headmaster's list of dos and donts combined with a palpable dash of Orwellian doublespeak - which prohibit its bloggers from hosting guest posts or writing "outside" their areas of expertise without consulting with the editors. In doing this SciAmBlogs has reduced its bloggers to - in physicist Sean Carroll's words - underpaid journalists and effectively dissuaded them from exploring new horizons. A blogger who gets paid a paltry sum of money every month for writing "safe" posts that won't get even a handful of people on Twitter riled up and are considered kosher by the editors is indeed no longer a real blogger, and I can definitely see why many of the network's previous writers quit instead of relinquishing their independence. 

Fortunately for the sake of the network some excellent bloggers whose writings I really enjoy, like Jennifer Ouellette, have stayed and I wish these folks good luck, but it's also clear they know what they are in for. There are also other specialists like Darren Naish who writes superbly on paleontology and prehistory. But these people are hedgehogs - acknowledged experts in specific subject areas. A science network truly worth its name needs both hedgehogs and foxes - people who like to muck around and explore other topics rather than mainly drill deep into one. They may not offer definitive answers but you can count on them to ask thought-provoking and even provocative questions. The network has now retained a few hedgehogs but it has lost all its foxes. The loss of foxes has greatly diminished the diversity of the ecosystem. 

In one sense the whole shebang was never the same since Bora Zivkovic left, but it really took recent events to bring it to this precipitous edge. In one sense this is a good decision since the site has now decided where the lines are drawn. The sad thing is that - for all its supposed emphasis on diversity - it has done the opposite and chose to draw the lines on the side of corporate approval instead of diverse opinion (and speaking of diversity, as this post on SciLogs noted, it's also interesting that most of the blogs which were cut - even for reasons other than low frequency of posting - were written by women). When it comes to maintaining diversity, the site has effectively gone the way of "We had to destroy the village in order to save it". I wish the remaining bloggers there good luck, but I doubt the environment will ever be the unique forum for independent voices and vigorous debate that it once was. Scientific American's Blog Network will probably survive in some form or another, but SciAmBlogs as it once stood is now over.

I leave the last word to Yana Eglit who wrote for the network for a long time and who sees in this unfortunate but predictable development a larger symptom of our collective woes, on SciAmBlogs as well as on social media in general. The whole thing is eminently worth reading so I quote here at length (the italics are mine):
"Social media has a powerful tendency towards homogenising opinions into a flavourless monolithic blob. While many who use social media are clearly and sincerely interested in promoting diversity, it is a bitter irony that the platform itself suppresses it. Dissenting opinions get transformed to strawmen and people become literal [insert favourite tyrants here]. Instead of trying to understand why someone you consider reasonable wrote something (in the case of twitter, in 140 characters!) so apparently shocking, and giving them the benefit of the doubt, you immediately jump to the conclusion that they are against whatever cause is in question. And the causes in question are usually far too complex to have a single position on. Especially one measured in not even words, but characters. 
But no benefits of the doubt are given — you stray from the path, you’re obviously up to no good. And you get axed. This breeds a form of conservatism — the group as a whole becomes too terrified to say something that will be misunderstood, and what could be a diverse discussion by multiple people of varied backgrounds becomes an echo chamber, a ‘circlejerk’ to use cruder but more to-the-point internet terminology.  
It’s somewhat ironic: in this system, you value minorities, you value women, you value the disadvantaged — but you do not value people. Individuals are worthless, to be cast aside the moment you find something disagreeable in them. People will support you until the first flaw, and then they take off to find someone not-yet-flawed instead. I admit that there’s an element in culture in my finding this strange and disagreeable — in Russian culture (as well as several other Slavic ones I’ve dealt with) we tend to see friendship and personal relationships (but especially friendships) as something rather sacred, something that should ideally transcend ideological differences, political disagreements, and especially character flaws. That can lead to issues in its own right, of course — everything comes at a trade-off, and every cultural description hides within it a massive statistical mess, but that’s something that always bothered me here, just how quickly people discard friendships they find no longer savoury. And this is especially nasty on the internet.
Mature nuanced discussions were never a blatant strong point of the internet, but here we have mature, nuanced individuals — intelligent, experienced individuals with a genuine interest to improve the world around them — having discussions on the level of teenage basement trolls. That, I think, is tragic. 
…and for what was all this? We lost a network. We lost voices who fought for us. We lost each other. We lost direction. We lost our actual main goal — to communicate the wonders of science with the world. And to some extent, I think this has damaged our rapport as bloggers with both journalist as well a scientist communities. Not to mention the curious public looking at all this in bemused confusion.We gained nothing."
I would go a step further and say that we gained something valuable, and then lost it with deliberate, purposeful and misguided conviction. It's something to mull over. However there is as always a silver lining. This story will serve as a cautionary tale for other blogging networks which wish to foster diversity. Meanwhile, both time and the Internet are limitless, so foxes like me will always have a multitude of new fields to play in.

The name's bond - reversible covalent bond.

Fifteen years ago most people would have laughed at you if you told them kinase inhibitors would become such a big deal: the received wisdom at that point was that anything that competed with ATP for one kinase would just indiscriminately hit other kinases. While that is generally true, we have found over the intervening decade that there is a wealth of detail - type II motifs, allosteric binding, relatively straightforward residue selectivity etc. - that can be tweaked to provide selectivity. In one fell swoop Gleevec upended the conventional wisdom.

A similar kind of thinking existed for covalent drugs a few years back, and I think that field too is going down the fortuitous road that kinase inhibitors took and defying the naysayers. This year especially has seen a bonanza of activity related to the discovery and fine-tuning of covalent inhibitors. The most striking and unexpected development in the field however has been the finding that one can find reversible covalent inhibitors that engage a protein target long enough to provide useful efficacy: the pessimistic thinking that had prevailed so far was mainly based on the potent off-target effects potentially arising from irreversible inhibitors. That thinking was justified...just as the thinking that kinase inhibitors would be non-selective was justified in 1998.

Reversible covalent kinase inhibitors in particular have seen a lot of interest and publications this year, and it's especially gratifying for me as a computational chemist to see that that the field is benefiting from both experimental and computational approaches. Jack Taunton at UCSF (who has started a company to exploit such kinds of inhibitors) has been a leader, but there have been others. Just recently there was a joint publication from the Taunton and Shoichet groups which used covalent docking techniques to prospectively discover JAK3 inhibitors. Taunton has also done some interesting work with Matt Jacobson from UCSF to use computational methods to tune covalent warhead reactivity - this work would be especially useful in tailoring reversible inhibitors to suit the target. A group at Pfizer did some similar work. Meanwhile the discovery of irreversible inhibitors for other important targets also isn't dead: earlier this year Nathanael Gray's group at Harvard published a report on covalent reversible inhibitors for CDK7, for instance.

It remains to be seen - it always remains to be seen - how many of these leads can survive the rigors of the clinic and how general the field becomes. But the approach in general certainly seems to be coming of age, and I will be watching its development with great interest. Quite a bit of promise there and also a real chance to defy some naysayers, which is what scientists especially relish.

Paul Schleyer: Among the last of the universalists

I was saddened to hear of the passing of Paul Schleyer, not exactly a household name among non-chemists but someone who was undoubtedly one of the most prolific and towering chemists of his time. Schleyer started out in synthetic physical organic chemistry and then moved to computational and theoretical chemistry. Starting out at Princeton, he moved to Erlangen in Germany and finally settled down at the University of Georgia, helping to make each one of these centers a leading hub for theoretical chemistry.

Schleyer was definitely one of the last universalities - at least in the theoretical territory of chemistry - and had a definitive grasp of almost every aspect of the field; from NMR spectroscopy (he came up with the valuable NICS metric for chemical shifts) and ab initio quantum chemical calculations to non-classical carbocations, lithium compounds and strained hydrocarbon synthesis (he synthesized adamantane, for instance). Most people are content to be experts in one or two fields, but it's probably not an exaggeration to say that Schleyer was close to being an expert in most of these fields. During his career he also seems to have co-authored papers and books with virtually every prominent figure in the field, from George Olah to John Pople to Jack Roberts. His publications on these and other parts of chemistry were prolific and deep, and he was also not one to shy away from spirited debate. I had the pleasure of watching him give a talk once and it was clear that he was a formidable opponent whose knowledge of chemistry would almost always supersede that of his 'adversaries'.

In fact that last aspect of his personality was on full display the first time I encountered him. This was as a graduate student when I came across a charming and very readable account of his debate with Herbert Brown on the infamous and invaluable non-classical carbocation debate. Titled "The Non-Classic Ion Problem", this little book is structured as a series of points and counterpoints in every chapter offered by Schleyer and Brown. The constant back and forth, the dissection of minutiae of solvents, reaction rates and spectroscopy, and the general unyielding yet cordial personalities of the two men are fascinating to watch. It's pure, unadulterated scientific debate at its best.

Schleyer was definitely one of the last and greatest practitioners of the golden era of physical organic chemistry, a time when chemists dedicated their lives to exploring the fundamentals of chemical reactions and structure with vigor and rigor. He is one of a handful of figures on whose shoulders we all stand and will be genuinely missed.

Philosophy begins where physics ends, and physics begins where philosophy ends

Richard Feynman - philosopher (Image:WashU)
A few months ago, physicist Sean Carroll has some words of wisdom for physicists who might have less than complimentary things to say about philosophy. The most recent altercation between a physicist and philosophy came from Neil deGrasse Tyson who casually disparaged philosophy in a Q&A session, saying that it can be a time sink and it doesn’t actually provide any concrete answers to scientific questions. Now I am willing to give Tyson the benefit of doubt since his comment was probably a throwaway remark; plus it’s always easy for scientists to take potshots at philosophers in a friendly sort of way, much like the Yale football team would take potshots at its Harvard counterpart.
But Tyson’s response was only the latest in a series of run-ins that the two disciplines have had over the past few years. For instance in 2012 philosopher David Albert castigated physicist Lawrence Krauss for purportedly claiming in his most recent book that physics had settled or at least given plausible answers to the fundamental question of existence. In reply Krauss called Albert “moronic” which didn’t help much to bridge the divide between the two fields. Stephen Hawking also had some harsh words for philosophers, saying that he thought “philosophy is dead”, and going further back, Richard Feynman was famously disdainful of philosophy which he called “dopey”.
In his post Carroll essentially deconstructs the three major criticisms of philosophy seen among physicists: there’s the argument that philosophers don’t really gather data or do experiments, there’s the argument that practicing physicists don’t really use any philosophy in their work, and there’s the refrain that philosophers concern themselves too much with unobservables. Carroll calls the first of these arguments dopey (providing a fitting rejoinder to Feynman), the second frustratingly annoying and the third deeply depressing.
I tend to agree with his take, and I have always had trouble understanding why otherwise smart physicists like Tyson or Hawking seem to neglect both the rich history of interaction between physics and philosophy as well as the fact that they are unconsciously doing philosophy even when they are doing science. For instance, what exactly was the philosophy-hating Feynman talking about when he gave the eloquent Messenger Lectures that became “The Character of Physical Law“? Feynman was talking about the virtues of science, about the methodology of science, about the imperfect march of science toward the truth; in other words he was talking about what most of us would call “the philosophy of science”. There’s also more than a few examples of what could fairly be called philosophical musings even in the technical “Feynman Lectures on Physics”. Even Tyson, when he was talking about the multiverse and quantum entanglement in “Cosmos” was talking philosophically.
I think at least part of the problem here comes from semantics. Most physicists don’t explicitly try to falsify their hypotheses or apply positive heuristics or keep on looking for paradigms shifts in their daily work, but they are doing this unconsciously all the time. In many ways philosophy is simply a kind of meta, higher level look at the way science is done. Now sometimes philosophers of science are guilty of thinking that science in fact fits the simple definitions engendered by this meta level look, but that does not mean these frameworks are completely inapplicable to science, even if they may be messier than what they appear on paper. It’s a bit like saying that Newton’s laws are irrelevant to entities like black holes and chaotic systems because they lose their simple formulations in these domains.
My take on philosophy and physics is very simple: Philosophy begins where physics ends, and physics begins where philosophy ends. And I believe this applies to all of science.
I think there are plenty of episodes in the history of science that support this view. When science was still in a primitive state, almost all musings about it came first from Greek philosophers and later from Asian, Arab and European thinkers who were called “natural philosophers” for a reason. Anyone who contemplated the nature of earthly forces, wondered what the stars were made up of, thought about whether living things change or are always constant or pondered if there is life after death was doing philosophy. But he or she was also squarely thinking about science since we know for a fact that science has been able to answer these philosophical questions in the ensuing five hundred years. In this case philosophy stepped in where the era’s best science ended, and then science again stepped in when it had the capacity to answer these philosophical questions.
As another example, consider the deep philosophical questions about quantum mechanics pondered by the founders of quantum mechanics, profound thinkers like Bohr, Einstein and Heisenberg. These men were brilliant scientists but they were also bona fide philosophers; Heisenberg even wrote a readable book called “Physics and Philosophy“. But the reason why they were philosophers almost by default is because they understood that quantum mechanics was forcing a rethinking about the nature of reality itself that challenged our notions not just about concrete entities like electrons and photons but also about more ethereal ones like consciousness, objectivity and perception. Bohr and Heisenberg realized that they simply could not talk about these far flung implications of physics without speaking philosophically. In fact some of the most philosophical issues that they debated, such as quantum entanglement, were later validated through hard scientific experiments; thus, if nothing else, their philosophical arguments helped keep these important issues alive. Even among the postwar breed of physicists (many of whom were of the philosophy-averse, “shut up and calculate” type) there were prominent philosophers like John Wheeler and David Bohm, and they again realized the value of philosophy not as a tool for calculation or measurement but simply as a guide to thinking about hazy issues at the frontiers of science. In some sense it’s a good sign then when you start talking philosophically about a scientific issue; it means you are really at the cutting edge.
The fact of the matter – and a paradox of sorts – is that science grows fastest at its fringes, but it’s also at the fringes that it is most uncertain and unable to reach concrete conclusions. That is where philosophy steps in. You can think of philosophy as a kind of stand-in that’s exploring the farthest reaches of scientific thinking while science is maturing and retooling itself to understand the nature of reality. Tyson, Hawking, Krauss, and in fact all of us, are philosophers in that respect, and we should all feel the wiser for it.

First published on SciAmBlogs.